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It is commonly understood that residential real estate brokerage fees in the 
US tend to run 6% or 7% within local markets for existing property resales.  
Exceptions to these historically uniform going rates are starting to appear, and 
utilization of the internet will provide new efficiencies that should lead to lower 
commission rates in the future.  One possible indication of where the long 
term commission rates may head, should price competition increase, is 
provided by a review of commission rates around the world.  This study is a 
first attempt to gather such data and begin the process of global comparisons.  
Most industrialized country brokerage rates are significantly below those of 
the US, although there are clearly differences in the services provided, red 
tape, and liabilities, as well as information access.  An exploratory model 
attempts to explain variations in fees around the world and deepen our 













Most residential real estate brokerage firms in the United States charge 
single-family home sellers a commission of 6% or 7% of the selling price, 
depending on the region
1.  Agents seem to compete for business on every 
dimension except price (commission rates) with claims of faster sales, higher 
selling prices, or better service.  This relative uniformity of commission rates 
within local markets, the ease of entry into the industry, and the relatively 
few sales per agent in the US, have encouraged debate over the efficiency of 
the industry compared to other industrialized countries
2.  International 
comparisons also beg the question: “What would happen if US brokers 
competed on price?”  A preliminary model presented using brokerage fees 
and data from around the world suggests that, based on global data, the US 
residential brokerage fees should run closer to 3.0%.  If the typical US agent 
were as productive as those in England, the brokerage fees would be closer 
to 1.5%.   
 
 
Pricing, Efficiency, and Brokerage Fees Around the World 
 
Debate over the efficiency of the residential real estate brokerage (RREB) 
industry has echoed through the literature since the late 1970s.  If the RREB 
industry is deemed grossly inefficient, the implication is that over time, with 
new innovations, commission rates (service prices) would come down and/or 
services would increase or improve.  On the side arguing for general 
efficiency are Lewis and Anderson (1999) and Anderson, Lewis, and 
Zumpano (1999).  On the other side are Miller and Shedd (1979), Crockett 
(1982), Wachter (1987), Yinger (1981), and others.  A key premise behind 
those arguing for inefficiency is the fairly uniform and rigid commission 
pricing within local markets for similar property types
3.   Prices appear to be 
                                                 
1 Homebuilders, as repeat customers with multiple listings, often pay 5%. 
2 Sale per full time real estate agent is measured annually. 
3 Note that imitative pricing may not require collusion, as would typically be the case with fixed 
pricing.  The market enforcement mechanism will be explained later in this paper.  Debate has 
also ensued over the issue of collusion.  Austin  (1973), Owen (1977), Barlett (1981), Yinger 
(1981), Wachter (1987), and Jenkins (1989) all argued for collusive behavior, while Miller and 
Shedd (1979) argued for interdependency.  More recently, Yavas (2001) argued that high fixed 
costs have made it impossible to have market driven commission rates.  Independent of the 
perspective on collusion, we agree with Yavas (2001) and will provide arguments that agents do 
not earn excess profits.  Criticism of the residential real estate brokerage industry in the past has 
probably been inhibited by the incestuous resource linkage, whereby many university real estate 
centers receive funding from license fees within a state.  This is true in States like Wisconsin, 
Texas, and Ohio. 14 Delcour and Miller 
   
abnormally stable for a competitive market.  A rare exception to this widely 
held belief was presented by Carney (1982)
4.   
 
Rather than use the history of somewhat uniform commission rates as the 
only evidence of “market” or long-term equilibrium commission rates in the 
US, we compared brokerage costs in other countries focusing only on 
residential resales.
5   Globally, we see much lower residential commission 
rates in most of the other highly industrialized nations, including the United 
Kingdom (UK), Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, Australia, and New 
Zealand (See Figure 1: International Commission Rate Comparisons).  Fees 
in Hong Kong, typically 1% for the seller, are among the lowest in the world 
even with the extra charges for lawyers typically incurred at closing.
6   In the 
UK, the commission rates average less then 2%.  The seller is often required 
to pay for some advertising costs up front without a contingency for this 
fixed charge, which lowers the risk of the broker spending money that may 
not be recovered through a successful sale.  In New Zealand and South 
Africa, commission rates average 3.14%.  In Singapore, the commission 
rates also tend to run around 3%.  Many countries have fees that average 5% 
or less, including Germany, Spain, Israel and Thailand.  Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Philippines also tend to be around 
5%.  It is hard to argue that non-US countries have more efficient 
communication technology, real estate public information or record access 
that would lead to lower commission rates.
7  
 
At the other end of the fee spectrum, commission rates in less developed 
countries with no public records and no reliable MLS (Multiple Listing 
Services), such as Russia and Belarus, fluctuate between 5% and 15%.  Net 
listings where fees may run even higher than 15% are also common in the 
Russian cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow.
8   The Chinese government 
recently developed a regulatory environment and license standards for its 
real estate industry.  The Chinese market experiences few real estate 
transactions, and the extremely high transfer tax of 15% severely constrains 
                                                 
4 See Michael Carney, “Costs and Pricing of Home Brokerage Services” The AREUEA Journal, 
Fall, No 3., 1982, p.331-354. 
5 Naturally, commission rates in other countries alone will not be sufficient evidence of long 
term equilibrium unless we also control for differences in the services provided.  Such a study is 
beyond the scope of this paper, although attempts have been made to collect such information. 
6 We are indebted to Ivan YF Chan, Business Development Director for Pacific Relocations for 
this information that has been verified with colleagues.  Their website is: 
http://www.chinarelo.com 
7 An attempt to proxy for economic efficiency is provided in Figure 4 based on data in the 
appendix, where it appears that the US is an outlier in terms of commission rates. 
8 Net listings where the broker keeps all of the fees above some minimum price are considered 
unethical by the National Association of REALTORS in the US and discouraged by the US 
Code of Ethics.  The reason for this position is the presumption that some agents will take 
advantage of naïve sellers and contract for a net list price far below actual value. International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees 15 
 
the incentive to transfer property.
9   High transfer taxes in countries like 
China and Greece certainly constrain the transfer of residential properties 
and encourage sub-optimal resource allocation where some households will 
be over-consuming housing and others under consuming.
10   
 
Benjamin, et. al. (2000) compared American and international real estate 
brokerage firms, and suggested several noteworthy differences between US 
residential brokerage commission and other overseas markets.  The 
comparison includes agency rules, representation, potential liability, and the 
use of auctions.  Liability tends to be higher in the US and agency tends to 
be more clearly separated between buyers and sellers.  Data on such 
differences is not readily available and beyond the scope of this study.   
 
According to Dotzour, et. al. (1998), many developed countries use auction 
markets simultaneously with traditional real estate listings.  This use of 
auctions seems to be gaining interest and market share in the US as well.
11   
Auction fees tend to be the same or higher than traditional listings, so this 
alternative is viewed merely as a way to accelerate the time to sale rather 
than a way to save on fees.
12    
 
Table 1 is a collection of international brokerage fees.  In all cases, the fee 
information sought is the total fee paid by the buyer and the seller.   
Arrangements with respect to agent splits are not always known.  Buyers’ 
fees are noted where utilized.  Also noted is any information on advertising 
fees or value added fees or taxes.  The authors have collected this direct data 
directly from brokers and industry experts within each country.




                                                 
9 Note that Hong Kong does not incur these same transfer taxes. 
10 Further research on the impact of transfer taxes in different countries delving into the volume 
of sales per capita could produce mor We are indebted to Ivan YF Chan, Business Development 
Director for Pacific Relocations for this information that has been verified with colleagues.  
Their website is: http://www.chinarelo.come insight on the true costs and impact of these 
transfer taxes. 
11 See “Auctions Gain Popularity Among High-End Sellers” Dayton Business Journal, 10/01/01 
by Lori Johnston.  Since 1980, the number of real estate auctions has quadrupled across the 
nation.  In 1998 alone, auction sales raked in $49 billion, up nearly 20 percent from the two 
previous years, according to the Gwent Group, a Bloomington, Ind.-based real estate auctions 
and consulting group.    
12 While anecdotal as evidence, the authors surveyed several real estate firms across the US that 
were involved in auctioning, and while most were reluctant to discuss fees, they indicated that 
the fees ran from 7% to 10%, depending on the services provided.  This is consistent with the 
fees of up to10% reported at Realtor.com magazine discussing the business of auctions. 
13 The attendees at the European Real Estate Society Meetings in Spain in June 2001 and the 
International Real Estate Society Meetings in Alaska in July 2001 were particularly helpful in 
confirming the data. 16 Delcour and Miller 
   
Table 1: International Commission Rate Comparisons 
Country  License    Real Estate Transaction Characteristics 
Argentina**  Yes  6%, where 3% was paid by the buyer, and 3% paid by the 
seller; does not require buyer broker. 
Australia  Yes  5% on the first $18,000, 2.5% -thereafter; also properties are 
sold through auction system; advertising is provided by real 
estate agent. 
Belarus  n/a  6%-15% commission, averaging near 10%.  Public 
information is scarce.  
Belgium Yes  3%  commission. 
Brazil  Yes  5% commission, less on a higher priced units. 
Canada  Yes  3-6% commission rate.  An agent handles on average 3 to 5 
sales per year.  
Caribbean***  Yes  5% - Jamaica, 3-5% - Trinidad & Tobago. 
China** & 
Hong Kong 
Yes  No set regulations and standards for a real estate transaction in 
China.  Commission fees vary from 5% to 10%.  Also, there is 
a 15% real estate transfer tax.  However, Hong Kong has a 
significantly lower real estate brokerage fee of typically 1% 
for the seller.  Hong Kong does not require dual representation 
and one agent may deal with both the buyer and seller.  
However, both parties typically have separate lawyer 
representation.  In Hong Kong, the maximum transfer tax is 
3.75%. 
Denmark**  Yes  2-4%, buyer pays 25% of sales price transfer tax; advertising 
is provided by real estate agent. 
Finland  n/a  Fees run to about 5% of the sale price on condos, and 3%-4% 
on single family homes.  Higher priced houses have lower 
commission fees.  The government collects a value added tax 
(22% of the selling price).  
France**  Yes  Only 50% of property sold is listed with a real estate agent; 
real estate transactions are kept very private; 50% of the real 
estate is sold by owner.  
Germany  n/a  Negotiable commission rate that varies from 3% to 6%.  
Greece  n/a  4% commission rate, where the buyer and seller are 
responsible for 2% each.  Also, there is a 12% value added tax 
on a real estate transaction.  
Indonesia**  No  5% paid by either buyer or seller, but not both; a buyer’s 
broker is required for real estate transactions. 
Ireland**  Yes  In cities 1.5-2%, and small towns 2-3%; also properties can be 
sold through an auction system. 
Israel  Yes  4% commission rate equally split between buyer and seller’s 
agents.  
Italy**  Yes  Paid by both buyer and seller: each party pays 2-3%. 
Japan**  Yes  3% commission rate.  
Malaysia**  Yes  3% on the first $100,000, and then 2% of the remaining 
amount of the sale; commission is paid either by buyer or 
seller, not both. 
Mexico**  Varies  5-10% commission rate.  Large emphasis on MLS.  
Netherlands**  Yes  1.5-2%, broker represents either the buyer or the seller but not 
both.  The seller pays the fees.  International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees 17 
 
Table 1: International Commission Rate Comparisons (continued) 
Country  License    Real Estate Transaction Characteristics 
Norway**  Yes  2-3%, broker represents both parties in the transaction. 
Philippines**  Yes  5%, broker represents either the buyer or the seller but not both. 
Russia  Yes  5% to 10%, but "net listings" are common; advertising is 
provided by real estate broker/agent; FSBO very common;  
buyer broker representation is not required.  Some commissions 
are set in dollar or ruble fee amounts.  Reliable market 
information is difficult to acquire. 
Singapore  Yes  1.5-2.0%, FSBOs are very rare; buyer broker representation is 
not required.  
Spain  Yes  Commission rate depends on the property location, averaging 
5% of total estate price.  
Sweden**  Yes  5%; commission is paid by seller.  10% commission is typically 
charged for lower priced units.  
Thailand  n/a  Commission rates vary from 3% to 5%.   
United 
Kingdom 
Yes  1%-2% is typical; in very competitive areas 0.5-0.75%; in low 
priced areas as high as 3.5%.  Advertising is provided by real 
estate broker/agent; buyer broker representation is not required.  
United States  Yes  6%-7%; advertising is provided by real estate broker/agent.  In 
1999, some real estate agents charged flat fees that ran from 2 
to 4 percent.  Auctions are increasing but usually at the same 
fees or higher than normally charged by the brokerage firm 
involved. 
* This number was calculated as Total Home Sales, which in 1999 (according to 
NAR Profile) was 6.5 million.  According to NARELLO, in 1999, there were 
515,225 active real estate brokers and 980,083 active real estate agents.   
** Information was obtained from http://onerealtorplace.com  
*** Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.  Data was also confirmed through the network 




Background on the US Residential Brokerage Industry 
 
For years, US real estate brokerage firms have operated via strong trade 
associations, most notably the National Association of REALTORs (NAR).  
Licensed agents may join local, state, and national associations, and thereby 
call themselves a “REALTORS,” which is a trade-registered name only 
available for use by members who agree to adhere to a specified code of 
conduct and pay local, state, and national dues.  In 1999, there were 760,000 
members of NAR and 2,121,918 active and inactive licensed brokers or 
agents nationally.
14   The US REALTOR Association has been successful in 
recruiting members from among the ranks of licensed agents and in 
                                                 
14  The number of active and inactive national real estate brokers was obtained from the 
NARELLO Digest of License Laws, 1999.  Apparently, many people keep a license in order to 
easily list a relative or a friend and can represent themselves so that they can “earn” a 
commission split or legal referral fee. 18 Delcour and Miller 
   
providing the historically essential MLS system.  It has been so successful 
that few members of the public and the media understand the difference 
between a licensed real estate agent and a REALTOR, and tend to view 
these terms as synonymous.
15    
 
It is not uncommon for the majority of real estate firms to be small.   
According to the NAR 2000 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers, 60%of real 
estate companies have five or fewer employees, and only 4% have more than 
50 workers.  Access to local MLS systems has been critical to small firms 
who rely on this database in order to assist their customers.  Most active 
agents have access to at least one local Multiple Listing Service (MLS).  In 
the US, some agents join several nearby MLS systems.
16     
 
Traditionally, the home seller pays the full commission rate at closing, even 
if the buyer has his/her own agent.  According to a 1999 NAR Survey, only 
15% of homebuyers rewarded their own agents directly.  This traditional 
deduction of the fee from the seller allows buyers’ agents to claim that “the 
seller is paying the fee,” while the sellers’ agents can always claim that “the 
buyer is indirectly paying the fee”.  Reality suggests that both buyers and 
sellers are providing support for the services required. 
 
Many local markets observe that more than half of the sales involved two 
firms or different agents, each representing one party to the transaction.  It is 
customary for the participating agents to share commission fees from the 
proceeds of the sale.
17  
 
Figure 2 is a theoretical depiction of the supply and demand of brokerage 
services, comparing perfectly competitive prices to rigid price setting 
practices.  Under perfect competition, price (Pe) is determined by the 
intersection of the demand curve (Dt) and the long run average cost curve 
(AClr).  The marginal cost curve (MC) is essentially a supply curve.  The 
total quantity of brokerage services supplied is limited to the competitively 
determined supply (Se), since marginal cost exceeds price beyond this point.
                                                 
15 It is interesting to note that real estate agents in Russia call themselves REALTORs.  They 
believe an agent indicates a person who represents others for a fee.  There is no affiliation with 
the American REALTOR Association or any dominant trade association that provides either a 
standard code of conduct or other MLS services in Russia. 
16 In larger metropolitan markets such as Los Angeles or Atlanta, a REALTOR has historically 
needed to join three or more MLS organizations in order to cover the entire geographic market. 
17 An in-depth knowledge of the nuances of the industry’s behaviors was based upon working in 
the industry, consulting for the industry, and a monograph of multiple agent interviews 
published by the Ohio State University for the Ohio Division of Real Estate “Profiles of 
Successful Residential Agents” January 1, 1999. International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees 19 
 
Figure 2: Demand and Supply of Brokerage Services under the 
Traditional Cooperative Intensive Commission System 
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P* = actual price or commission rate. 
Pe = long run competitive equilibrium price. 
Dp* = the quantity of brokerage service demanded at price P*. 
Se = long run competitive equilibrium supply. 
S* = actual supply given price P*. 
Dt = the share of total demand for an individual firm. 
Dpc = the share of total demand for a price cutter firm. 
MC = marginal cost curve for an average firm in the industry, the supply 
curve. 
AClr = long run average cost curve for an average firm in the industry. 
MCpc = marginal cost curve for an individual firm (in this case that of the 
price cutter who pays smaller splits to agents per transaction). 
ACpc = average cost curve for an individual firm with marginal cost curve 
MCpc. 20 Delcour and Miller 
   
When price is set above Pe, at say P*, the quantity of brokerage services 
supplied increases along with the marginal cost curve until P* no longer 
exceeds MC, at S*.  The difference between Se and S* can be referred to as 
“excess supply” under a market with competitive pricing.  Note that excess 
profits for the average firm will not exist even with a non-competitive price 
above Pe.  The increase in supply absorbs the increased profit margin until P 
= MC is in equilibrium again.
18   
 
In contrast to the pure long run economic conclusion implied here, we have 
seen real agent earnings increase as the real price increases.  In fact, from 
2000 until late 2002, real estate home prices surged throughout the US, with 
the increases significantly ahead of the rate of inflation, while homes were 
sold in record times and with absolutely no indication of reduced 
commission rates.
19   Evidence of increasing agent earnings will be provided 
in the following section of this paper.  One factor on the supply side has 
been increased educational requirements, along with the associated costs of 
maintaining a license.  This has forced some marginally productive agents 
out of the industry – to the benefit of the remaining agents. 
 
Excess supply, as depicted here, could not exist unless some enforcement 
mechanism prevents most firms from charging commission prices below P*.  
Take the case of an individual firm, which has marginal cost (MCpc) and 
average cost (ACpc) curves as shown in Figure 2.  Because P* exceeds MC 
at the AC minimum, the firm decides to become a price cutter (pc), and 
lowers the price below P* and above or at MC = AC.  Normally, such a 
price-cutting move would increase the total demand for the firm’s services, 
causing total revenues to increase, albeit with a lower fee per transaction.  If 
such a move increases the price-cutting firm’s demand, other firms could be 
expected to react with similar price moves, thereby competitively driving the 
market-derived price down to Pe.  However, when such behavior reduces a 
firm’s share of total demand (Dpc) to a level below AC, then such a price 
move would mean going out of business. 
 
                                                 
18 There are two perspectives that can be confusing when one examines the economics of the 
industry.  This graph is an aggregate industry perspective emphasizing the impact of supply 
elasticity with rigid prices, but from the perspective of the individual firm, it will need to 
increase the commission split paid to productive agents so that their variable costs will rise, 
thereby squeezing out any excess profit.  From the agent’s point of view, there will also not 
appear to be any excess profit, as the increased supply of agents means that the pie is merely 
split into more pieces.  Overall, the result of non-price competition is merely excess supply, 
while in the absence of supply elasticity one would observe excess profit.  Excess profit would 
occur if the supply could be constrained to less than Se. 
19 Data source: FNIS and www.valueyourhome.com, where prices have been seen to rise so fast 
that many analysts are talking about real estate price bubbles. International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees 21 
 
How can the price-cutting firm’s share of demand be so detrimentally 
affected (from Dt to Dpc)?  This behavior is explained by recognizing that a 
significant portion of Dt involves two cooperating brokers.  That is, a firm’s 
share of Dt is not only dependent on the public, but to a significant degree on 
other firms.  When a price cutter reduces the commission rate, it affects not 
only its own profit margin on those successful sales, but also reduces the 
portion available for other cooperative firms providing buyers.  The shift 
from Dt to Dpc is a result of the loss of cooperative business by the price-
cutting firm.  When cooperative sales represent a significant portion of the 
firm’s business, such price-cutting behavior is not economically feasible.  To 
the extent that firms depend on one another to share the total demand for 
their services, imitative pricing will be the rule of survival in local markets.
20    
 
Unless they involve consent or collusion, uniform pricing among 
competitors is not illegal.  Imitative pricing practices, even as a result of 
conscious parallelism, may also be entirely proper.  Even without collusion, 
the uniform commission rates found in the real estate brokerage industry 
have been necessitated by the interdependency of the small traditional 
brokerage firms.  An antitrust violation would exist if real estate brokers or 
salespersons made agreements to fix commission rates, and acted on that 
arrangement. 
 
In an attempt to achieve completeness, we should note that some academic 
analysts have argued that the marginal cost curve for brokerage firms is quite 
inflexible, and they note correctly that the profit margins are low.
21    
However, it should be noted that most of the brokers’ costs are variable.  The 
largest single cost per transaction is the split paid to an agent.  The argument 
is that brokers can’t lower fees unless they lower the agent' cost, but they 
can’t lower the agent cost and still retain any agents.  This is true, unless of 
course the firm could achieve more total and net revenue with lower fees, 
and unless the agents would be satisfied with more transaction business, 
albeit at lower fees per transaction.  Most US based brokerage firms, except 
for a few brave price cutters, have rejected such a possibility.  But we can 
observe lower commission rates and more productive systems working quite 
well in many other countries. 
 
Evidence of Real Earnings Driving Agent Supply 
 
In the absence of price competition for listings, we observed a fluctuation in 
the number of agents entering or leaving the market in response to changes 
                                                 
20 In contrast, Anglin and Arnott’s (1991) study of residential real estate brokerage supports the 
collusion hypothesis among brokers and industry behavior.   
21 Abdullah Yavas at Penn State, for example, was one of these academics. 22 Delcour and Miller 
   
in real inflationary adjusted revenues.
22   Some casual empiricism suggests 
this behavior is true over the long run, yet greater barriers to obtaining a 
license have also increased over the last four decades.
23   Since 1960, home 
prices have generally exceeded the inflation rate.  Commission rates have not 
declined on a percentage basis during periods when home prices rose faster 
than inflation, and real commission rates have increased accordingly.  The 
typical real estate agent has a median gross personal income of $43,500 
annually, an increase of $10,000 during the period from 1995 to 1999 (1999 
NAR Membership Survey).  The median income for real estate brokers is 
$63,100, an increase of 31% during the same period.  
 
Figure 3a presents a comparison between the cumulative changes in the 
consumer price index (CPI) and the mean single-family house price over 
four decades.  According to the economic data, the changes in the mean 
single-family house price outpaced the changes in CPI during the 1960 – 
1999 period. 
 
The data presented in Figure 3b reflects the changes in the number of 
licensed real estate brokers/agents compared to their annual income between 
1960 and 1999.  Based on the information provided in Figure 3b, we 
concluded that as real estate brokers’ per capita income has risen, more 
brokers have entered the industry.   
 
Figure 3c compares the changes in the CPI, the mean single-family house 
price, the number of real estate brokers/agents, and their cumulative income 
during the last four decades.  This economic information confirms our 
previous conclusion that as the mean-single family house price increases 
over time, more real estate brokers/agents will enter the industry and 
compete for the same business, thus placing downward pressure on their 
incomes. 
                                                 
22 This point is supported by Jud and Winkler (2001), where they showed a very elastic response 
to agent earnings. 
23 Jud and Winkler (2001) showed that stricter educational requirements influence agent supply.  
In many states, pre-license educational requirements have more than doubled since 1960, and 
continuing education requirements (non-existent in 1960) have increased.  For example, Ohio 
requires, on average, 10 hours of continuing education per year.  Other states, like Florida and 
Alabama, mandate 30 to 45 hours of continuing education.  At the same time, Vermont obligates 
its real estate brokers/agents to have 4 hours of continuing education for every license-renewing 
period (every 2 years).  According to NAR’s 1999 Survey, all Realtors have a high school 
diploma, and more than 40 percent of real estate professional have a bachelor degree.  When 
pre-license and continuing education standards increased in the US, non-US countries pre-
license requirements range from high school diploma (Jamaica, Ireland, Japan, etc.) to at least 3 
years of college education (Argentina, Australia, Denmark, etc.).  Most of the non-US countries 
do not require post-license continuing education.  
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International Brokerage Comparisons with the US: A 
Simple Preliminary Model 
 
Four factors will be utilized to examine and explain brokerage fees around 
the world.  Admittedly the use of typical fees, based on frequency or modes, 
and averages for most variables induces smoothing, and future models may 
be able to refine upon these results with improved data.  Much of the data 
collected has been provided via direct sampling and is subject to error.  Yet, 
the overall results show promise. 
 
The four factors considered for impact on brokerage fees are related to the 
categories of informational efficiency, corruption, the practice of dual or 
single agency, and the number of sales per agent.  Each will be explained in 
turn.  Only the null hypotheses are stated. 
 
In non-US countries, it appears that the commission rates are lower when the 
information within the market is more efficient, open, and reliable.  Less 
developed countries, like Russia, with a primitive or no MLS system, show 
the highest commission rates (10% or even 15%).  This makes sense in a 
market where information is costly and unreliable, and transactions are 
burdened by a high government bureaucracy.  Thus, we anticipate that the 
least economically efficient countries have the highest brokerage 
commission rates, whereas developed countries’ consumers pay lower 
commission fees.  Thus, we hypothesize:  
 
H0: Residential brokerage fees decrease with overall market efficiency.  
Figure 3c. Change in CPI, Mean Single-Family House Price, Number of Licensed RE 
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As an attempt to proxy for economic efficiency, using a variable that is 
available across all countries represented in the sample survey, we have 
selected the GDP per capita and compared this to the median commission 
rate as provided below in Figure 4 with data provided in the appendix.
24   
The per capita GDP is a sufficient proxy for the overall market efficiency.  
As more public and reliable information becomes available in non-US 
markets, it will be interesting to test our findings with an expanded data 
sample or alternative measures of market efficiency.  For now, there is little 
alternative.  
 
Figure 4: Real Estate Commission Fee vs. Per Capita GDP 
























 Note: The data was obtained from the World Bank Group web-site 
(http://www.worldbank.org) 
 
Statistical results:  Regression F statistic 12.257 
  R squared = .304  Adjusted R squared = .280 
Beta Coefficient on Fee -.104 t= -3.501  significance 
= .002 
GDP and Fee.  K-S test .984 on GDP 1.236 on Fee 
Chi-Square test = 21.333 
                                                 
24  While subject to upward bias for developed countries and downward bias for primitive 
subsistence economies, GDP per capita has been used by the World Bank for decades as the best 
single indicator of the average standard of living for any country.  Here, we presume that 
economic efficiency and the standard of living are correlated.  While there may be better 
indicators of a country’s quality of life, there are few better indicators of economic efficiency 
that can be compared across nations with any reliable source of data. 
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The statistical GDP/capita = f (Real estate commission fee) Figures some 
explanatory power (R-squared equals to approximately 30%), and will be 
used in the general model discussed below.  One might note, however, that 
the fees charged in the US do not conform well to this measure, as seen in 
Figure 4.  For this reason, the general model will be run with and without the 
US observation data.    
 
If there is less price competition in the US, then according to the theory 
provided earlier, the supply of agents should be higher and sales per agent 
should be lower, eliminating excess profits per agent.  One indication of a 
higher supply of agents relative to the potential revenue per transaction is the 
number of sales for the typical full time agent.  For the average REALTOR 
in the US, this number is about seven, but for full time agents it is about 12.  
This estimate is based on survey data, but it is included as an indication of 
the supply impact that higher commission pricing per transaction might 
induce. 
 
H0: Residential brokerage fees are lower in a country with a higher number 
of sales per full time agent. 
 
 
The Impact of Uncertain Markets and Bureaucratic Risks 
 
Within some countries it is difficult to complete business transactions in a 
timely fashion without occasionally being generous to local officials.   
Corruption within economies adds significant friction and uncertainty to the 
market, and directly to transactions costs as they become priced into fees.  
Countries in our sample have different political and regulatory environments 
that might impact the cost of doing business as a market player or 
intermediary.  For example, developed countries in North America, Asia and 
Pacific Rim, and Western Europe have a stable market economy with 
relatively little corruption of government officials and very few changes in 
the regulatory environment.  For the most part, these countries ensure and 
protect market participants’ real estate ownership rights.  At the same time, 
less developed countries face frequent regulatory changes and are more 
susceptible to bribes that grease the system for the donors.  In an attempt to 
proxy for this cost of doing business, we incorporated a corruption risk index 
into our model.  It assesses the distortion of the predictable transaction 
processing and reduction of government and business efficiency.  It is likely 
that real estate brokerage commission rates are greater in countries with a 
higher corruption index compared to countries with a lower corruption index, 
since agents must include this extraordinary cost of doing business to the 
usual business costs.  The corruption index was obtained from International International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees 27 
 
Country Risk Guide.
25   It is measured on a scale from one to six, where six 
is assigned to a least corrupted country.  Thus, we hypothesize:  
 




The Impact of Buyer/Seller Separate Agents 
 
It is not uncommon in real estate transactions around the world to utilize a 
single agent representing both sides, which is known as a dual agency.  In 
the US, a dual agency is legal only if it has been fully disclosed, and separate 
buyer and seller agency is common.  When multiple agents are involved, the 
cost of doing business is likely to grow as well as the fairness of the 
representation.  Thus, we hypothesize:  
 
H0: Residential brokerage fees are lower in a country where dual agency 
representation is common. 
 
 
Empirical Models Tested 
 
We employed the following four models:   
Real state brokerage fee = ƒ (GDP per capita) 
Real state brokerage fee = ƒ (GDP per capita, Corruption 
Index) 
Real state brokerage fee = ƒ (GDP per capita, Corruption 
Index, Agent representation) 
Real state brokerage fee = ƒ (GDP per capita, Corruption 
Index, Agent representation,  
Sales per agent), where  
 
 
Real state brokerage fee (FEE)   is measured in %; 
GDP per capita (GDPP)     is measured in US$ per capita;  
Corruption Index (CI)    measures a threat of country’s 
instability and risk environment.  CI 
                                                 
25 The International Country Risk Guide is the PRS Group publication.  The corruption index is 
an assessment of corruption within the political system.  It measures the threat of economic and 
environmental instability. 28 Delcour and Miller 
   
takes a value of “1” for countries with a 
Corruption Index between 1 to 3, and 
“0” for countries with a Corruption 
Index between 4 and 6;  
 
  Agent representation (AGENTS)   represents the number of real 
estate agents participating in a 
typical real estate transaction 
(dual or single agent 
representation).  Takes a value 
of “0” for dual agency 
representation and “1” if 
otherwise; and  
 






The empirical results are summarized in Appendices 2 and 3.  It appears that 
commission rates in the US are abnormally high for a country as efficient as 
we presumed and as price competitive as we would like it to be.  Those who 
believe that the US brokerage industry is efficient and price competitive 
must find these results puzzling.  Explanations for relatively higher fees for 
US firms include greater liability and the provision of more services, 
whether they are desired by consumers or not.  But the interdependency of 
the traditional industry that has tended to reduce price competition and 
encourage imitative pricing seems to be the most compelling explanation.   
 
The statistical models feature good explanatory power (R-squared values 
vary from 0.304 to 0.688 for the model that includes the US, with an R-
squared that reaches .718 for the all variable model, excluding the US).   
Taking out the US improves the fit, as this is consistent with the notion that 
US fees are an anomaly.  All eight models are statistically significant.  As 
anticipated, the estimated coefficient for GDPP is negative and statistically 
significant.  Thus, we accept the null hypothesis that fees are lower with a 
higher economic efficiency.
26  
                                                 
26 The policies governing the cooperative commission split vary from country to country.  In 
Argentina and Italy, it is common for commission fees to be split between buyer’s and seller’s 
agents.  In Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and the Philippines, either the buyer or the 
seller, depending on the real estate contract, pays commission fees.  Denmark and some other 
countries (e.g. Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico, Italy, and Hong Kong) charge transfer ownership 
sales taxes and require notary participation in real estate transactions.   International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees 29 
 
With respect to the prevalence of the dual agency, the estimated coefficient 
on a dummy variable is negative and statistically insignificant.  Thus, we 
rejected our null hypothesis, and it appears that residential brokerage fees are 
not higher in countries where separate buyer and seller agency representation 
is common.  Nuances within countries may not be appropriately captured by 
a single dummy variable.  
 
With respect to the corruption index, the estimated coefficient is negative 
and statistically insignificant.  We have anticipated the negative sign for the 
corruption index’s estimated coefficient.  Residential brokerage fees are 
lower in countries with less corruption, but the measurement here is a bit 
crude and statistically weak. 
 
Finally, we accepted the null hypothesis that residential brokerage fees are 
lower in a country with a higher number of sales per full time agent.  The 
estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant.    
 
 
Based on Global Data, What Should US Residential Fees 
Run? 
 
We estimated the US residential brokerage fees using the full variable final 
model estimated without US data, as shown in Appendix 3.  Based on the 
estimated coefficients, US residential brokerage fees should equal something 
closer to 3.0% versus the common 6% or 7% fee.  Note that this result is 
sensitive to the number of sales per agent.  If the number of sales per agent 
for England is plugged into the same model (much higher than that of the US) 
the fee estimate equals a fee close to the actual fees observed in England.  
The conclusion is that fees in England, Hong Kong, and many other price 
competitive markets are close to equilibrium, while fees in the US seem to 
be artificially high based on price rigidity within the US system. 
 
 
Further Differences Observed by Country and Model 
Limitations 
 
In some countries, commission rates vary with the difficulty of the sale or 
the price level of the home.  This is the case for Sweden, Finland, Ireland, 
Mexico, and Belarus.  Higher priced homes see lower commission rates in 
these regions, indicating that the cost structure and profitability of 
buying/selling homes is not linear with respect to price.  This behavior is 
consistent with price competitive markets, and we should expect the same to 30 Delcour and Miller 
   
occur within any market that is not characterized by price rigidity.
27   Within 
this study, such variation was not captured. 
 
 
The Internet Impacts the International Real Estate Industry   
 
Since 1999, the real estate industry has become more web-based.  According 
to the web-site www.owners.com in 2000, more than one million Americans 
sold their homes by themselves.  About 20% of sellers executed their real 
estate transactions utilizing FSBO (For Sale By Owner) web-sites.      
 
Thrall (1998), as well as Benjamin, Jud, and Sirmans (2000), suggested that 
the growing use of the Internet in all stages of the real estate process will 
have a dramatic impact on both the information diffusion and the economies 
of an MLS.  Baen and Roulac (1998) and Jud and Roulac (2001) stated that 
technological changes will have a tremendous affect on how real estate is 
bought and sold in the future.  Guttery, Baen, and Benjamin (2000) 
speculated that information technology and greater efficiency in the 
matching of buyers and sellers will lead to fewer active sales agents.   
Muhanna (2000) suggested lower commission rates will occur.   
 
Yavas and Colwell (1999) concluded that changes occurring in the real 
estate industry as a result of the information revolution may encourage the 
development of new forms of MLS systems.  They speculated that the new 
form of MLS will look more like an "Internet bulletin board”.  Access cost 
of this bulletin board will be very low; therefore, if traditional real estate 
companies are to stay in business, they must develop and implement new 
types of brokerage contracts.  To effectively compete with on-line multi-
service real estate brokerage e-tailers, traditional real estate companies must 
make the Internet their ally.  In their analysis of the effects of technology 
changes on real estate brokerage, Guttery, et. al. (2000) reached a similar 
conclusion. 
 
In their working paper, Zumpano, et. al. (2001) presented empirical evidence 
that supports the notion of increasing the efficiency of real estate agents 
through the diffusion of the Internet.  Their finding supports previous 
empirical inferences of decreasing commission rates through a greater 
utilization of technology in the real estate industry.  The point of all these 
authors is to generally support greater efficiency and price competition in the 
future for the residential real estate industry. 
                                                 
27 In some instances, high priced US homes are probably listed for lower fees, yet, it is not clear 
where this break point begins in local markets.  For example, in Hawaii, Prudential Locations 
charges 6% even on homes above a million dollars.   






This is the first study to compare, on a global basis, residential brokerage 
fees and attempts to model observed fees.  While differences were observed, 
we saw most industrialized countries at 5% or less, and most less 
industrialized countries were above 5%, the US being an exception.  Future 
studies might be able to consider constraints on agent supply, such as 
education and license fee requirements, continuing education requirements 
and other institutional constraints.  Such data is not readily available at this 
time. 
 
We agree with many other academic analysts that eventually, US fees will 
come down.  The key is that the potential business gain derived from price-
cutting in the US must outweigh the expense of lost cooperation from other 
brokerage firms.  Indeed, if a few of the larger firms make a successful break 
from the common pattern of uniform commission rates, they could trigger a 
price revolution in the brokerage industry.    
 
Beyond a la carte services and a menu of packages for consumers, as 
suggested by Jud and Roulac (2001), there are several other implications of 
price competition on the real estate brokerage industry as observed in non-
US markets.  One implication is that lower priced homes should see higher 
commission rates relative to higher priced homes.  Lower end homes might 
require commission rates in excess of 7%, or even 10%, if they are not in a 
very marketable condition.  This could explain why some more productive 
agents refuse to list lower priced homes.  It may also clarify why agents put 
forth less advertising, hold fewer open houses, and expend much less effort 
into such listings.  We should also see more marketable and higher priced 
homes listed at lower percentage commission rates, similar to those found in 
the United Kingdom.  
 
The success rate of FSBOs should continue to increase as the number of 
private MLS web-based sites decline, and market concentration increases, 
making buyer searches easier and more efficient.
28     The traditional 
brokerage firm using more automated services and expert systems to serve 
both consumers and agents will likely provide a range of service packages.  
A drop in US commission rates to the 5% range or less would likely drive 
                                                 
28 No more then 5 to 10 private side US-based MLS systems are likely over the long run, as 
economies of scale and natural efficiencies combine with consumer resistance to using so many 
different websites.  Links between affiliated sites might help to maintain multiple sites as long as 
the integration for consumers is seamless.  Fewer FSBO websites imply a higher success rate, as 
the survivors become more effective. 32 Delcour and Miller 
   
many marginal producers out of the industry.
29    This “weeding-out” process 
is likely to result in a more professional and experienced agent becoming the 
norm.  For consumers both in the US and other markets, this is the greatest 
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APPENDIX 1   
List of Countries, Real Estate Commission Fee, Per Capita GDP, 
Corruption Index, Agency Representation, Sales per Agent in Units, 
1999. 
 








1999 Sales per 
Agent, units per 
year 
Argentina 6  7,550 3 15 
Australia 5  20,950 5 20 
Belarus 
Belgium 








Brazil 5  4,350 3 N/a 





































Ireland 4  21,470 2 N/a 
Israel 4 16,310 3 10 
Italy 3  20,170 3 24 
Japan 3 32,030 3 28 
Malaysia 3  3,390 3 N/a 
Mexico     7.5  4,440 4 14 
Netherlands 2  25,140 6 36 
Norway 3  33,470 5 23 
Philippines 5  1,050 2 N/a 
Russia              10  2,250 1 12 
Singapore 2  24,150 4 25 













2 23,590 5 38 
United States   6  31,910 4 12 
Note:   The GDP per capita data was obtained from the World Bank Group web-
site   (http://www.worldbank.org).  The Corruption Index is published in the 
International Country Risk Guide by the PRS Group, where 1 is assigned 
to the most corrupted country and 6 to the country with the least corruption. 
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Regression Analysis Results with the US 
 





Regression Analysis Results without the US 